Campen v. Snow (1 D.T. 1)

(1 D.T. 1)

2011

Campen v. Snow 

Dickered Terms Supreme Court

February 24th, 2011, Heard in Supreme Court

Factual Background

It was a dark and stormy night.  Mr. Campen had met with The Snow in a pub down Roxie Blvd.  The meeting was casual and brief, but it had a sole purpose.  Mr. Campen was to enter into a gentlemen's agreement with The Snow.  The offer was made by Mr. Campen for The Snow to specifically, "fall to the ground on the following Wednesday night at 7:00 P.M., look beautiful and get everyone out of school."  The Snow accepted this offer by shaking the hand of Mr. Campen for the consideration of Mr. Campen's "companionship, love and care" on the following Thursday.  Mr. Campen was to perform snow angels in The Snow, make The Snow into a man and throw the snow at others showing them how marvelous The Snow could be once it interacted with a human.

Both The Snow and Mr. Campen agreed to a stipulated damages provision that stated that if The Snow was to breach the contract in any way, Mr. Campen would be entitled to three "White Christmases" at some point in his life.  However, The Snow didn't arrive until 4:00 A.M. the following Thursday and in much less quantity and in much less magnificence.  This caused Mr. Campen to attend school that day and amounted to a breach of contract.  Mr. Campen brought suit against The Snow, the trial court held for Mr. Campen, and this was affirmed by The Court of Appeals.  The Snow appealed.

MR.  JUSTICE CARLIN delivered the opinion of the court.

And it was a deal that had been stricken betwixt a chilled, blistery and callous individual and a source of winter merriment on an ominous eve.  The chilled individual holding his hand out on behalf of indolent students in the region struck a deal with our beloved flurry as he had once done with The Snow's icy brethren.  In return for the offer the black-hearted soul would merely spend time with our beloved flurry the next day, a much gratuitous consideration if there ever was.

The purpose of this deal was to allow the black-hearted soul to be free the following Wednesday night to avert his crusty peepers from the text of learned judges across the nation and to free himself from the incarceration of knowledge.  However, our beloved flurry was forced into inaction by the intervening cause of the resilient warm air that facilitated this litigation.  And now as an award for this inaction the black-hearted soul wants in return three white December 25ths so he can turn his eyes to the clean snow in a hope that it will bring life to his colorless existence.

The primary issue that should be before us today is whether this contract is a valid one. But this is a settled fact and the parties do not contend that, even though the lack of consideration or even the questionable mutual assent of the parties would be enough to discredit this chilled agreement.  But our beloved flurry has a pure sole and it is with tremendous candor that he comes to the court not contending the existence of a contract that he honors but yet only asking for a release from the darkened hand of the stipulated damages provision of this agreement.  It is our judgment on the matter of the enforceability of this provision that our beloved flurry seeks and it is that judgment that he shall be awarded.

When a court is asked to look to a liquidated damages provision within a contract, whether it be oral or written, it must juxtapose the differing effects of such a provision.  Much like statutory interpretation involves looking to both the criminal or civil effects of a law, we must decide whether the effects of the provision are penal in nature or if they are regulatory.  If this provision does function as a penalty then it is entirely unenforceable. Wasserman's Inc. v. Township of Middletown, 137 N.J. 238, 645 A.2d 100 (1994).  And if it was unreasonably unrelated to the probable damages that a court would settle upon then it is equally unenforceable. Dave Gustafson & Co. v. State, 156 N.W.2d 185 (1968).

In addressing the effect of this provision we must begin with its language.  The provision states that the black-hearted soul would be entitled to three "White Christmases" should our beloved flurry breach the contract.  Our beloved flurry would be forced to venture from it's quaint abode upon the wintry hillside away from its family and settle upon the weathered dirt patch that the black-hearted soul calls home.  It would require our beloved flurry to perform at least three times before the black-hearted soul ceases.

Requiring a performance such as this and of such great magnitude is not only a penalty, because it subjects  our beloved flurry to vile puppetry at the hands of the black-hearted soul, but it is also completely unrelated to the contract in question and equally unreasonable in that it does nothing to arrive at the fruition of the agreement.

To decide in this case for one that hasn't the moral fortitude of a tangerine would be a terrible disservice to this land.  But it is not that reason that we reverse the lower courts decision on this matter.  The agreement between our beloved flurry and the black-hearted soul  involved a stipulated damages provision which is entirely unenforceable as a matter of law, because it's effects are penal in nature and it is unreasonable unrelated to the contract at issue.

SO LET IT BE WRITTEN, SO LET IT BE DONE, we hereby REVERSE the lower court's judgment.